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Resumo 
A absorção tecnológica de novas e avançadas tecnologias é amplamente entendida como 
sendo um motor de crescimento económico para os países tecnologicamente menos 
desenvolvidos, nomeadamente as Economias Emergentes (EEs). Trata-se, pois, de um 
processo bastante complexo devido à heterogeneidade dos países, especificamente em termos 
tecnológicos, produtivos e em termos socioeconómicos. As EEs podem alcançar 
convergência económica e tecnológica, bem como crescimento produtivo, através de 
investimento direto estrangeiro e de importações de bens de capital oriundos de países 
tecnologicamente mais avançados. Contudo, ainda não é claro, para a literatura existente, 
qual dos canais, Investimento Direto Estrangeiro (IDE) ou importações de bens de capital é 
o mais relevante para o crescimento económico das EEs, e como a capacidade de absorção 
(i.e., capital humano e I&D) se relaciona com o IDE e as importações de bens de capital. 
O principal objetivo do presente estudo passa por contribuir para a literatura empírica da área, 
através da estimação do impacto do comércio, IDE e das capacidades de absorção no 
crescimento económico de um painel de 39 EEs no período 1961-2015. Metodologicamente, 
recorremos a estimativas robustas do modelo de efeitos fixos com dados em painel num 
período longo (54 anos, 1961-2015), intermédio (19 anos: 1996-2015) e curto (10 anos: 2005-
2015). Além disso, acomodamos a habitualmente negligenciada heterogeneidade entre 
países, através da análise da capacidade de absorção das 39 EEs de acordo com o seu nível 
de rendimento e grupo geográfico.  
Os resultados das nossas estimações enfatizam a importância das importações de bens de 
capital e dos fluxos de entrada de IDE no crescimento económico no modelo de base de 
período longo (1961-2015). Ademais, para os períodos mais recentes (1996-2015 e 2005-
2015), as principais alavancas de crescimento para as EEs são a capacidade de absorção, mais 
concretamente, a interação entre capital humano/I&D, e os fluxos de entrada de investimento 
direto estrangeiro. Tais resultados vão ao encontro das expectativas da literatura de que o 
capital humano e o investimento doméstico em I&D facilitam o processo de absorção de 
spillovers oriundos do IDE. Finalmente, esta pesquisa, também, revela a existência de uma 
profunda heterogeneidade entre as trajetórias de crescimento dos EEs, através de uma análise 
detalhada dos determinantes de crescimento de longo prazo, por grupo de rendimento e região 
geográfico. 
Palavras-chave: Economias Emergentes; Crescimento económico; Importações de bens de 
capital; IDE; Capital humano; I&D 
Códigos JEL: F00; F10; F14; F21; I20; O10; O30.  
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Abstract 
The technological absorption of new frontier technologies is widely perceived as an engine 
of economic growth for the least technical developed countries, namely the Emerging 
Economies (EEs). It is a rather complex process due to the associated country-specific 
heterogeneity on technology, production, and socioeconomic factors. EEs tend to achieve 
economic and technological convergence and productivity growth through foreign direct 
investment and by importing capital goods from more technological advanced countries. 
However, it is not yet clear, for the existing literature, which channel, FDI or trade, is the 
most relevant for EEs’ economic growth, and how these countries’ absorptive capacities (i.e., 
human capital and R&D) relates to FDI and trade in this regard.   
The main aim of the present study is to contribute to the empirical literature in the area by 
estimating the impact of trade, FDI, and absorptive capability on the economic growth of a 
panel of 39 EEs over an extended period, from 1961 to 2015. Methodologically, we resorted 
to robust estimations of fixed effects panel data models over a long (54 years: 1961-2015), 
intermediate (19 years: 1996-2015) and a short (10 years: 2005-2015) period. Furthermore, 
we accommodate the often neglected heterogeneity between countries by analysing the 
absorptive capacity of the 39 EEs according to their income level and geographical groups. 
The results of our estimations emphasise the importance of imports of capital goods and 
inwards FDI flows on economic growth in the baseline extended model (1961-2015). 
Moreover, for the most recent periods (1996-2015 and 2005-2015), EEs’ most important 
growth promotors are the absorptive capacities, most notably the interaction between human 
capital/R&D, and foreign direct investment inflows. These results meet the expectations of 
extant literature that human capital and domestic investments in R&D facilitates the 
absorption process of spillovers that come from FDI. Finally, this research also unveils the 
existence of a profound heterogeneity among EEs’ growth trajectories by providing an in 
depth analysis of long run growth determinants by group of income and world regions. 
 
Keywords: Emergent Economies; Economic growth; Imports of capital goods; FDI; 
Human capital; R&D 
JEL-Codes:  F00; F10; F14; F21; I20; O10; O30.
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1. Introduction  
International technological catching-up is an important vehicle to promote productivity 
and economic growth (Krammer, 2010). Extant literature (e.g., Krammer, 2010; Glas, 
Hübler, and Nunnenkamp, 2016) have found that political and economic openness to 
trade and the inflows of FDI are important to accelerate technological transfer and foster 
countries’ (total factor) productivity growth. However, as far as empirical studies go, 
imports of capital goods and inflows of foreign direct investment are not enough on their 
own to close the technological gap.  
Analyzing forty-seven (transition and developed) countries, Krammer (2010) found that 
in order to benefit from knowledge spillovers, economies need to possess a given level of 
human capital and domestic investment in Research and Development (R&D). In other 
words, total factor productivity is heavily influenced by the level of human capital which 
affects the ‘absorptive capacity’ of a nation (Xu, 2000; Krammer, 2010; Teixeira and 
Fortuna, 2010). Indeed, several authors highlighted the importance of human capital and 
domestic investments in R&D for advanced and emerging countries in their absorption 
process of spillovers that come from trade (Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010; Banerjee and 
Roy, 2014) and FDI (Li and Liu, 2005; Baharumshah and Almasaied, 2009; Su and Liu, 
2016).  
Improvements in human capital are, according to Saccone (2017), one of the main 
contributors to economic growth in ‘emerging economies’ (EEs) and governments should 
promote internal capacity-building activities (such as human capital and R&D) to meet 
the economic and social challenges that the populations of these countries face (see Azam 
and Ahmed, 2015). According to Glas et al. (2016), EEs tend to achieve economic and 
technological convergence and productivity growth through two main channels: foreign 
direct investment (FDI), and international trade (specifically, by importing capital goods 
from more technological advanced countries). However, so far, the extant studies fail to 
clarify which of the three factors/channels - FDI, trade, or absorptive capacity (i.e., human 
capital and R&D) - are the most relevant for economic growth in EEs, and how absorptive 
capacity relates to FDI and trade in this regard.   
The present study aims at fill in this gap, by testing the technological absorption 
hypothesis, that is, by assessing the extent to which human capital and R&D (i.e., 
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country’s absorptive capacity) interact with trade and FDI and impacts on long run 
economic growth of EEs. 
Additionally, and although there are some studies that have already analyzed the process 
of EEs’ technological catching-up (e.g., Banerjee and Roy, 2014; Glas et al., 2016; Su 
and Liu, 2016) such studies do not explore EEs’ heterogeneity. Specifically, they tend to 
analyze only a very specific group of large EEs, the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China) as a whole (see Glas et al., 2016), or focusing on one of these countries 
individually (India - Banerjee and Roy, 2014; China - Su and Liu, 2016). 
The present dissertation aims also to fil this empirical gap, by providing insights on how 
absorptive capacity, international trade and FDI can influence the technological catching-
up process not only of the whole set of EEs, but also considering distinct groups (income 
poorer, intermediate, and richer) of EEs over the last five decades. 
In methodological terms, we resort to econometric models by employing fixed effects 
panel models including 39 EEs (as classified by Saccone (2017)), over the period 1961 - 
2015, to disclosure the nature of the impact of absorptive capacity and technology transfer 
on economic growth. 
The present dissertation is structured as follows. In the next section, a literature review 
containing the theoretical framework and empirical data that sustain our presumptions 
about the impacts of technology diffusion on economic growth. In Section 3, we describe 
the methodology of our estimations. Then, in Section 4, we analyze the obtained results. 
Finally, in Section 5 we conclude the study by highlighting the main outcomes and the 
limitations of our research. 
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2. Literature review on trade, FDI, absorptive capacity and long-run economic 
growth. Main hypotheses to be tested 
2.1. Trade and and long-run economic growth 
Trade, most notably the imports of machinery and equipment, is an important carrier of 
technological development through spillovers, vital to less developed countries’ growth 
(see Fagerberg, 1994; Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 1997; Krammer, 2010).  
Existing empirical literature focused on developing (e.g., Dulleck and Foster, 2008; 
Cuadros and Alguacil, 2014) and emergent (e.g., Banerjee and Roy, 2014; Glas, Hübler, 
and Nunnenkamp, 2015) countries concludes that imports of capital goods have a 
significant positive impact on these countries’ economic growth through increases on 
total factor productivity. Krammer’s (2010) research further suggests that trade brings 
benefits for all types of countries, stating that less developed, developing and developed 
countries can all reap large benefits from trade.  
The research by Coe et al. (1997) have emphasised the importance for developing 
countries of absorbing foreign R&D, included in imported capital goods, to help those 
countries to reverse their technological backwardness and foster economic growth. Due 
to these countries’ internal scarcity of R&D, the North-South trade represents an 
opportunity for them to receive advanced technology created by more advanced, 
industrialized countries.  
Emerging economies (EEs) use the trade of intermediate goods as a channel to acquire 
new frontier technology, being later introduced in their production processes as 
technological advanced inputs, which then results in the development of new products 
and new skills and competences (Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci, 2004). For instance, the 
imports by China of parts and components resulted in technological transferences and 
further absorptions that developed their ‘assembly activities’ by acquiring technological 
advanced inputs abroad, and thus becoming capable of improving their final product and 
export high-tech products (Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci, 2004). 
Considering the above, international trade contributes to economic growth, and more 
specifically to total factor productivity growth, namely through the imports of machinery 
and equipment from more technological advanced countries (Fagerberg, 1994; Coe et al., 
1997; Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010; Banerjee and Roy, 2014). Such acquisitions of foreign 
technological advanced machinery and equipment allow less developed countries to 
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potentially benefit from knowledge spillovers (Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010) through the 
acquisition of disembodied and embodied technology (Banerjee and Roy, 2014). Thus, 
openness to imports of capital goods facilitates the absorption of international frontier 
technology and is an important vehicle to achieve productivity and economic growth 
(Lee, 1994; Krammer, 2010; Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010; Banerjee and Roy, 2014; 
Cuadros and Alguacil, 2014), as well as, income convergence among countries (Ben-
David, 1996).  
In other words, trade liberalization allows imports of capital goods to work as a channel 
of technology diffusion and competitiveness building factor for less developed countries, 
having a positive impact on economic growth (Lee, 1994; Hendricks, 2000). However, 
this variable alone might not be capable of expanding a country’s innovation progress 
process (Fu, Pietrobelli, and Soete, 2011). The impact of the imports of capital goods on 
economic growth is likely to be associated with other productivity and economic growth 
enhancer explanatory variables such as investment in physical capital (Fagerberg, 1994), 
human capital (Dulleck and Foster, 2008), indigenous R&D efforts (Fu et al., 2011), and 
domestic conditions, such as intuitional and socioeconomic developments (Cuadros and 
Alguacil, 2014).  
For less developed countries to absorb the technology embodied in imports it is necessary, 
in parallel, to build technological domestic knowledge and capacities driven by 
indigenous R&D investments (Fu et al., 2011) and human capital (Dulleck and Foster, 
2008) to learn, assimilate and replicate the technology embodied in the imported capital 
goods. This implies that technology diffusion through trade cannot be successful on its 
own, but it is rather the result of a complementary relation between the internal converge 
efforts to develop internal absorption capacities plus the international spillovers that come 
from foreign frontier technology. 
Taking into account the above arguments, we conjecture that: 
H1: EEs that import more capital goods from technological advanced countries tend to 
present higher growth rates. 
 H1a: The higher the EEs’ human capital stock, the stronger the impact of capital 
goods from technological advanced countries on EEs’ economic growth. 
H1b: The higher the EEs’ R&D intensity, the stronger the impact of capital goods 
from technological advanced countries on EEs’ economic growth. 
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2.2. Foreign direct investment and and long-run economic growth 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is defined as “a category of cross-border investment 
made by a resident entity in one economy (the direct investor) with the objective of 
establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) that is 
resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor” (OECD, 2008: page 17).  
This cross-border investment tend to have a positive impact on productivity and economic 
growth (e.g. ; Li and Liu, 2005; Batten and Vo, 2009; Wang, 2009; Kramer, 2010; Su and 
Liu, 2016) by promoting capital formation and technological improvements (Wang, 
2009) and is often seen as a necessary condition for the economic and technological 
development of developing countries, emerging economies and economies in transition 
(OECD, 2002) through international diffusion of spillover effects and productivity 
improvements (Wang, 2009). 
Empirical research on emerging markets yields mixed results on the direct impact of FDI 
on economic growth in recipient developing countries, emerging economies and countries 
in transition. Indeed, even though most of studies found a positive correlation between 
FDI spillovers and economic growth (Blomström and Persson, 1983; Nair-Reichert and 
Weinhold, 2001; Buckley, Clegg, and Wang, 2002; Li and Liu, 2005; Wei and Liu, 2006; 
Baharumshah and Almasaied, 2009; Wang, 2009; Kramer, 2010;  Cuadros and Alguacil, 
2014; Su and Liu, 2016 ), others found a negative correlation (Borenztein, Gregorio, and 
Lee, 1998; Konings, 2000; Mencinger, 2003), or even an non-existent relation between 
FDI and economic growth (Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Carkovic and Levine, 2002; 
Falki, 2009). The contradictory results of these empirical studies might be attributed to 
the different causes, such as the measurements used by researchers to capture foreign 
presence (Buckley et al., 2002), or errors in the estimation method (Nair-Reichert and 
Weinhold, 2001). Ozturk (2007) suggests that empirical studies focusing on less 
developed countries are more likely to observe a positive impact of FDI on growth. 
The theoretical framework that provides the foundation for empirical studies concerning 
the impact of FDI on economic growth is associated with the neoclassical and the 
endogenous growth models (Ozturk, 2007). The neoclassical growth theory limits the 
effect of FDI to the short-run, so that, in the long-run, under the assumption of 
diminishing returns of capital, FDI would not affect the long-run economic growth, as the 
host country’s economy converges to the steady state, leaving to the permanent 
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technological shocks the role of promoting growth (De Mello, 1997). In the endogenous 
growth theory, FDI promotes economic growth through capital formation, technology 
transfer, and by building new stocks of knowledge in the recipient economy, which occurs 
through labor training and skill acquisition (Ozturk, 2007; Forte and Moura, 2013).  
For the endogenous growth models, technology transferences are the main drivers of 
positive externalities resultant of foreign presence in less developed countries (OCDE, 
2002; Forte and Moura, 2013). Multinational corporations, regarded as highly 
technologically advanced firms and world leaders in investments in research and 
development (R&D) activities (Borensztein et al., 1998; OCDE, 2002; Wei and Liu, 
2006) are crucial to spread technology world-wide, thus transforming FDI into an 
important vehicle of technology improvement to developing countries by promoting the 
transmission of advanced technologies and managerial skill (Borensztein et al., 1998; 
Forte and Moura, 2013). Borensztein et al. (1998) suggest that FDI is likely to be the main 
channel of technology diffusion for developing countries because of its higher efficiency 
when compared to domestic investment.  
Among the major channels of technology transfer - vertical linkages with suppliers or 
purchasers in the host countries, horizontal linkages with competing or complementary 
companies in the same industry, migration of skilled labor, and the internationalization 
of R&D -, the vertical “backward” linkages with local suppliers in developing countries 
are the ones that generate more significant positive technological transferences (OCDE, 
2002) and productivity spillovers (Javorcik, 2004). This is a consequence of the relation 
between MNEs and local suppliers, which might result in management training and 
assistance in the production process, quality control, acquisition of intermediate products 
and new clients (OCDE, 2002; Javorcik, 2004).  
The presence of multinational firms also contributes to enhance human capital formation 
by providing training to the local labor force (Borensztein et al., 1998; Teixeira and 
Lehmann, 2014), although a higher public education promoted by local authorities has a 
bigger impact in raising the internal knowledge and skill levels of the labor force (OCDE, 
2002).  
The empirical studies that support the positive effect of FDI on the economic performance 
of the recipient country, pointed out the fact that foreign technology frontier capital has a 
positive significant impact on domestic firms through productivity and non-productivity 
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spillovers (development of high-tech new products) (Teixeira and Shu, 2012) and by 
enhancing local competitiveness (Buckley et al., 2002). Indeed, the entrance of foreign 
investors in emerging markets accelerates technology and knowledge diffusion to 
domestic firms through the creation of externalities and spillovers, enhanced by the 
acquisition of participations on the capital of domestic firms and the development of 
financial markets (Konings, 2000; Manole and Spatareanu, 2014). Foreign investments 
permit the strategic restructuring and upgrading of equipment and production processes 
and the introduction of new products and processes (Konings, 2000; Un, 2016).  
In emerging markets, the degree of the effects of technological spillovers on productivity 
is dependent on the internal R&D and firms’ own knowledge to internalize foreign know-
how and knowledge (Buckley et al., 2002) and reduce the technological gap, meaning 
that a domestic firm’s capacity to absorb foreign technology is correlated to its capacity 
to learn from foreign firms (Wei and Liu, 2006). To further strength this absorption 
relation, the diversity of FDI of the country of origin positively influences local 
productivity thus amplifying the scope of knowledge from which a firm can potentially 
learn, better so if these inflows of knowledge come from the OCDE countries (Zhang, Li 
and Zhou, 2010). 
However, these positive repercussions of FDI inflows on the economic growth of host 
countries are extremely dependent on the existence of internal favourable circumstances 
and capabilities (Hermes and Lensink, 2003; Batten and Vo, 2009; Kummer-
Noormamode, 2015). These latter are even more relevant for less developed countries 
because of their precarious social and economic situation (Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2003; 
Azam and Ahmed, 2015). Indeed, the positive effect of FDI inflows on economic growth 
is very heterogeneous among developing countries (Alguacil, Cuadros, and Orts, 2011) 
and highly correlated with the stock of human capital (Borensztein et al., 1998; Xu, 2000; 
Li and Liu, 2005; Batten and Vo, 2009). Moreover, Borensztein et al. (1998) found a 
positive relation between FDI and the level of educational attainment. The creation of a 
domestic threshold of human capital is a vital condition for a country’s absorptive 
capacity of FDI spillovers by contributing to reduce the ‘knowledge gap’ between the 
recipient developing country and the developed world (OCDE, 2002).  
Taking into account the above arguments, we conjecture that: 
H2: EEs that receive higher inflows of FDI tend to present higher growth rates. 
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H2a: The higher the EEs’ human capital stock, the stronger the impact of FDI on 
EEs’ economic growth. 
H2b: The higher the EEs’ R&D intensity, the stronger the impact of FDI on EEs’ 
economic growth. 
 
Even though inflows of FDI do have a positive impact on productivity growth, empirical 
statistical research concerning less developed countries (e.g., Krammer, 2010; Glas et al., 
2015) demonstrate that imports of capital goods yield a statistically more significant 
effect on economic growth of less technological developed countries than inflows of FDI. 
The findings by Neelankavil, Stevans, and Roman Jr. (2012), focusing on 37 developing 
countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, also attribute lower importance to the 
impact of FDI inflows on economic growth in less developed economies. According to 
the authors, although inflows of FDI promote real GDP growth, this only holds in the 
short-run; in other words, FDI inflows are not capable of explaining real GDP growth in 
the long-run. Over the long-run, and according to Neelankavil et al. (2012), country’s 
related variables such as openness to trade, human capital, and fiscal and monetary 
policies, might have a greater impact on the economic growth of developing countries. 
The effect of FDI on economic growth on least developed countries is dependent of the 
achievement of a degree of development in education, technology, infrastructure and 
health (OCDE, 2002). 
In short, we conjecture that: 
H3: The impact of capital goods from technological advanced countries on EEs’ 
economic growth is higher than that of FDI.  
 
2.3. Human capital, R&D and countries’ absorptive capacity 
Although both trade (Krammer, 2010; Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010; Banerjee and Roy, 
2014) and FDI (Krammer, 2010; Azam and Ahmed, 2015; Su and Liu, 2016) can promote 
economic and productivity growth through technological spillovers, their effects are 
heavily influenced by the internal capability-building factors that determine a country’s 
‘absorptive capacity’ of foreign frontier technology. 
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Countries’ absorptive capacity usually encompasses two main dimensions: human capital 
and R&D investments (Wang, 2007; Krammer, 2010). This capacity can be described as 
a recipient country’s ability to identify and assimilate foreign frontier technology and it 
is likely to impact positively and significantly on total factor productivity (Nelson and 
Phelps, 1966; Abramovitz, 1986; Glas et al., 2015). 
Due to the complexity of its dimensions, human capital can be decomposed in many 
different variables, mainly related to education, health (e.g. life expectancy, fertility rates 
or infant mortality rate), and ‘social capital’ (Barro and Lee, 1997; Barro and Lee, 2000; 
Barro, 2013). Human capital can be more accurate measured as a stock variable which 
takes in account the labours force’s education (Wößmann, 2003; Teixeira and Fortuna, 
2010). However, education (Barro and Lee, 1993; Barro and Lee, 2000) is a broad concept 
and accommodates several variables related with school enrolment, adult literacy rates, 
and educational attainment, being the latter often considered a proxy for the level of skill 
possessed by a given set of the population (e.g., labour force or individuals aged twenty-
five and over). Education tends to accelerate technology absorption (Nelson and Phelps, 
1966) and through its positive impacts on total productivity growth facilitates the 
international technological catch-up process (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). 
Human capital theory, developed by Schultz (1961) and Becker (1962), sustain the 
relation between human capital and economic performance. Schultz (1961) introduces 
the human resources of an economy as a form of capital, recipient of knowledge and skill 
acquired through investments in education which contribute to the productive superiority 
of more advanced countries (Becker, 1962). An economy capable of investing in human 
capital education can build a faster economic growth and escape from the poverty gap 
(Schultz, 1961). So, according to Temple and Voth (1998), human capital accumulation 
sets the pace for the industrialization process of countries by lowering the cost of adoption 
of foreign technologies thus facilitating the technology diffusion process, specially, when 
accompanied by equipment investment. Empirical studies, applied to both developed and 
developing countries (see Table 1) consistently find that human capital has a significant 
positive direct impact on productivity and economic growth, thus confirming the 
theoretical framework behind human capital. Thus, we hypothesised that: 
H4: EEs highly endowed with human capital tend to grow faster. 
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Table 1: The impact of absorptive capacity (AC) and technology diffusion channels on a country’s economic growth 
Authors (year) 
Countries 
analysed 
Period 
analysed 
Dependent variable 
 Core independent variable - 
absorptive capacity 
Other independent variable Empirical results 
Borensztein et al. 
(1998) 
69 developing 
countries 
1970-1989 Real GDP per capita 
 
Educational attainment 
FDI inflows as a share of GDP 
GDP; Government consumption to GDP; Black 
market premium; Political Instability; Political 
rights; Financial development; Inflation rate; 
Quality of institutions. 
 
FDI (interaction w/ human capital) *** 
FDI: Negative impact 
 
Carkovic and 
Levine (2002) 
71 countries 1960-1972 Real GDP per capita 
 
FDI inflows as a share of GDP 
Initial income per capita; Inflation; 
Government size; Openness to trade; 
Black market Premium; Private Credit. 
No impact 
Li and Liu (2005) 84 countries 1970-1999 Real GDP per capita  
Educational attainment 
FDI inflows as a share of GDP 
Gross domestic investment to GDP 
Population growth 
Policy variables 
Technology gap 
Telephone lines 
FDI*** 
FDI (interaction w/ human capital) ** 
FDI (interaction w/ Technology gap) ** 
Human capital *** 
Baharumshah and 
Almasaied (2009) Malaysia 1974-2004 Real GDP per capita 
 Educational attainment 
FDI  
Exports 
Domestic investment 
Initial income 
Financial intermediation 
FDI** 
Human capital** 
FDI (interaction w/ human capital) ** 
Su and Liu (2016) 
China (230 largest 
cities) 
1991-2010 Real GDP per capita 
 Educational Attainment 
Foreign direct investment as a share 
of GDP 
Stock of foreign direct investment 
Real GDP per capita   
Population growth rate 
Fixed capital investment as a share of GDP 
FDI (interaction w/ human capital) *** 
FDI*** 
Human capital** 
Wang (2007) 40 countries  1976 -1998 
Total factor 
productivity  
(TFP) 
 
Educational Attainment 
Trade-related foreign R&D stock 
 
Human capital*** 
Trade-related foreign R&D*** 
Krammer (2010) 
47 countries (27 
transition, 20 
developed 
countries) 
1990- 2006 
Total factor 
productivity 
(TFP) 
 Educational Attainment 
Tertiary enrollment 
Domestic R&D capital stock 
Trade and FDI spillovers 
 
Investment and governments’ shares of GDP 
 
Human capital *** 
R&D *** 
International trade*** 
FDI *** 
Teixeira and 
Fortuna (2010) 
Portugal 1960-2001 
Total factor 
productivity  
(TFP) 
 Educational Attainment 
Domestic R&D capital stock 
FDI inflows as a share of GDP 
International Trade (imports of 
machinery, licenses and royalties 
acquired to foreign) as a share of 
GDP 
 
Human capital ** 
R&D*** 
Human capital (through imports of 
licenses and royalties) *** 
R&D (through imports of machinery) 
*** 
Human capital (through inward FDI) * 
Cuadros and 
Alguacil (2014) 
28 developing 
countries 
1999–2009 
Total factor 
productivity 
(TFP) 
 
FDI (total and in different sectors) 
Trade (imports of capital goods) 
Human Development Index 
World Bank’s governance indicators 
Trade** 
FDI*** 
Glas et al. (2015) 
Brazil, Russia, 
India, China 
1995–2009 
Total factor 
productivity  
(TFP) 
 Educational Attainment 
Domestic R&D capital stock 
Imports of capital goods 
FDI inflows as a share of GDP 
Domestic investment 
FDI (interaction w/AC) *** 
Trade (interaction w/ AC) ** 
Trade*** 
FDI: Negative impact 
Banerjee and Roy 
(2014) 
India 1950-2010 
Total factor 
productivity 
(TFP); 
Real GDP per capita 
 Educational Attainment 
R&D expenditure stock 
International Trade (imports of 
machinery and transport equipment, 
non-resident patent applications) 
Financial deepening 
Share of non-food credit to GDP 
Human capital *** 
Trade*** 
R&D *** 
Trade (interaction w/ human capital)*** 
Trade (interaction w/ R&D) *** 
Notes: *** (**)[*] Significant at 1% (5%) [10%] level.  
Source: Own elaboration     
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Research and development (R&D) is often the bases for innovation and builds knowledge 
stocks, proving to be crucial for technological progress and productivity growth (Teixeira, 
2007; Sun, Wang, and Li, 2016). Domestic investments on R&D capital stocks enhance 
a country’s capacity to absorb foreign R&D spillovers (Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 
2008) and are often measured by the expenditures in R&D (Coe et al., 2008; Krammer, 
2010; Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010), resultant of private (business-level) and public 
investments. Fagerberg (1987) defines R&D as a ‘technology input’ measure from which 
results the country’s capabilities to imitate foreign imported technology. 
The endogenous growth theory (see Aghion and Howitt, 1998) provides a neo-
schumpeterian approach on technology progress and long-run economic growth based on 
business firm’s investments in R&D. Accordingly, technological progress is a result of 
endless innovation processes through competition that creates R&D capital stock which 
foster economic growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). 
Coe and Helpman’s (1993) empirical evidence corroborate the endogenous theory in 
which domestic and foreign R&D capital stocks positively impact a country’s total factor 
productivity. Indeed, developing countries can benefit from R&D spillovers from 
industrialised countries, thus boosting their output growth (Coe et al., 1997).  
We therefore conjecture that: 
H5: EEs that are highly intensive in R&D tend to grow faster. 
 
Country’s ‘absorptive capacity’ is a country’s platform of assimilation of foreign 
technologies (see Nelson and Phelps, 1966) that promote the technological catching-up 
process, which is vital to less developed countries (Abramovitz, 1986). This ability to 
internalize, absorb and utilize foreign technological knowledge equips a country with the 
capacity to create new technologies and increase their productivity efficiency, which can 
potentially generate economic growth and drive the less developed country’s convergence 
process forward (Abramovitz, 1986; Elmawazini, 2014).  
Extant empirical evidence has suggested that the internal investment in capacity-building 
activities, mainly in human capital and R&D, is necessary to absorb embodied and 
disembodied foreign technology, because it improves a country’s capacity to identify and 
adopt new products, processes, knowledge, and organizational competences (see 
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Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010; Banerjee and Roy, 2014). In 
particular, empirical studies have demonstrated (see Table 1) that the interaction of 
domestic capability-building variables (human capital and R&D) with technology 
diffusion channels (trade and FDI) impact positively and significantly on countries’ 
economic growth. Available literature for developing countries, emerging economies and 
countries in transition emphasises the importance of importing capital goods (e.g. 
Cuadros and Alguacil, 2014; Banerjee and Roy, 2014; Glas et al., 2015) and receiving 
foreign investment inflows (Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001; Buckley et al., 2002; 
Glas et al., 2015; Su and Liu, 2016) for economic growth. 
Summing up, a certain threshold of human capital and/or internal R&D is necessary to 
absorb international frontier technological spillovers, namely when interacted with trade 
(e.g. Wang, 2007; Krammer, 2010; Banerjee and Roy, 2014; Glas et al., 2015) or FDI 
(Krammer, 2010; Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010, Glas et al., 2015; Su and Liu, 2016), in 
order to promote economic growth (Xu, 2000; Soukiazis and Antunes, 2012). 
Considering the above, we hypothesise that for EEs: 
H6 (=H1a/H2a): The impact of capital goods from technological advanced countries 
/FDI on economic growth is stronger the higher the human capital stock. 
H7 (=H1b/H2b): The impact of capital goods from technological advanced countries 
/FDI on economic growth is stronger the higher the internal R&D intensity. 
 
2.4. Other explanatory variables  
A country’s economic growth might occur through four main channels: FDI, trade, human 
capital and R&D. Other variables, however, are likely to impact on countries’ economic 
growth, and therefore a study on the economic growth of EEs should control for such 
variables.  
Following the relevant literature in the area, we can establish that countries’ economic 
growth can be positively influenced by the quality of political and institutional 
environment, macroeconomic stability, and openness to trade (see Asiedu, 2002; Hermes 
and Lensink, 2003; Li and Liu, 2005; Batten and Vo, 2009; Kummer-Noormamode, 
2015). Some empirical studies (e.g., Hermes and Lensink, 2003; Alfaro, Chanda, 
Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek, 2004; Iamsiraroj and Ulubaşoğlu, 2015) have pointed out the 
importance of developing internal financial markets to maximize benefits from FDI and 
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materialize those into economic growth. Additionally, some previous empirical studies 
found that economic growth is inversely related to government expenditure (Landau, 
1983; Barro, 1991; Barro and Lee, 1994), inflation (Fischer, 1993; Barro, 1995) - that can 
be manifested through the reduction of productivity growth (Fischer, 1993) and the 
reduction of the propensity to invest (Barro, 1995) -, government-induced market 
distortions (Barro, 1991; Barro and Lee, 1994), and political instability (Barro, 1991; 
Barro and Lee, 1994). Population growth is also often considered an important variable 
to explain economic growth (Li and Liu, 2005; Moral-Benito, 2012; Su and Liu, 2016). 
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3. Methodology  
3.1. Model specification 
The existing literature relevant to our analyses (see Table 2) has resorted to different 
estimation techniques. Specifically, several empirical studies use panel data models, 
repeated observations of the same units over time, to estimate the relation between 
technological transfer channels and economic growth for a large panel of countries over 
extensive periods of times with the objective of correcting for continuously evolving 
country’s heterogeneous technology, production, and socioeconomic characteristics 
(Verbeek, 2004; Li and Liu, 2005).  
Table 2: Synthesis of relevant studies according to their method of analysis 
Authors (year) Countries analysed Period analysed Estimation Methods 
Borensztein et al. (1998) 69 developing countries 1970-1989 Panel data 
Li and Liu (2005) 84 countries 1970-1999 Panel data 
Wang (2007) 
40 countries (25 developing 
countries and 15 
industrialized OECD trading 
partners) 
1976 -1998 Panel data 
Glas et al. (2015) Brazil, Russia, India, China 1995–2009 Panel data 
Su and Liu (2016) China (230 largest cities) 1991-2010 Panel data  
Carkovic and Levine 
(2002) 
71 countries 1960-1972 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and Dynamic panel data  
Cuadros and Alguacil 
(2014) 
28 developing countries 1999–2009 Dynamic panel data  
Baharumshah and 
Almasaied (2009) 
Malaysia 1974-2004 Co-integration 
Teixeira and Fortuna 
(2010) 
Portugal 1960-2001 Co-integration 
Banerjee and Roy (2014) India 1950-2010 Co-integration 
Krammer (2010) 
47 countries (27 transition, 20 
developed countries) 
1990- 2006 
Panel unit root and Panel Co-
integration  
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Thus, in accordance to the literature, the present dissertation employs a panel data 
econometric model to a set of 39 EEs 1 , classified using Saccone’s (2017) recent 
categorization, over the period from 1961 to 2015. In contrast with Saccone (2017) we 
considered Serbia and Montenegro as separated countries benefiting from data 
                                               
1  Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland. Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Zambia. 
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availability. Unlike the cross-section and time series analyses, panel data models have the 
advantage of explaining individual unit’s different behaviors and its changes at different 
periods in time, thus taking into account the heterogeneity between countries over the 
relevant time span (Verbeek, 2004; Greene, 2011). 
In order to assess the impact of technology transference channels (imports of capital 
goods, FDI, human capital, and R&D) on economic growth of EEs, during the proposed 
time frame (1961-2015), we empirically test the hypotheses mentioned in Section 2, using 
the following multiple linear specification: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡  + 
+ 𝛽6(𝐻𝐶 ∗ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐾)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7(𝑅&𝐷 ∗ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐾)𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽8(𝐻𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝐼)𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽9(𝑅&𝐷 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝐼)𝑖𝑡 ⏟                                                
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+
+ 𝛽10𝐶 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡, 
 
Where i represents the country, t the time period, and:  
𝒀 country’s economic growth; 
ImpK imports of capital goods (in % GDP); 
FDI   inward flows of foreign direct investment (in % GDP); 
HC human capital stock; 
R&D domestic expenditure in R&D (in % GDP); 
HC* ImpK interaction between human capital and the imports of capital goods; 
R&D* ImpK interaction between R&D and the imports of capital goods; 
HC*FDI interaction between human capital and foreign direct investment; 
R&D*FDI interaction between R&D and foreign direct investment; 
C vector of control variables (e.g., government expenditure, political rights, inflation, 
population growth, and trade openness). 
 
3.2. Data and variable description 
The dependent variable, 𝒀𝒊𝒕 , is an indicator of country i’s economic growth, which 
results, among other, from the technological transfer process. Existing empirical studies 
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(see Table 1) measure economic growth mainly using two proxies: annual average growth 
rate of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita or Total Factor Productivity (TFP). 
Given that for some EEs data on TFP is not available, we estimated the econometric 
specification above using both variables, the annual average growth rate of real GDP per 
capita and TFP growth. For this end, we retrieved the annual average growth rate of real 
GDP per capita data from the World Bank, database which reports values at constant 
local currency. To measure the TFP annual growth rate, we extracted data from the Penn 
World Tables (version 9.0) that reports TFP levels at constant 2011 prices against the 
reference year (2011) and then we proceeded to calculate the annual growth rates.  
The independent variable imports of capital goods (ImpK) is proxied by the share of 
capital goods imports at current PPPs, extracted from the Penn World Tables (version 
9.0). It stands as an indicator of embodied technology diffusion (see Teixeira and Fortuna, 
2010; Banerjee and Roy, 2014), and is expected to positively affect economic growth and 
total factor productivity growth (Lawrence and Weinstein, 1999). 
Regarding the inflows of FDI to host emerging economies, we measure these inflows as 
a ratio, that is, in percentage of the GDP (e.g. Borensztein et al., 1998; Hermes and 
Lensink, 2003; Alfaro et al., 2004; Li and Liu, 2005). This variable focuses exclusively 
on the inward flows of FDI received by EEs, which presumably will benefit from the 
knowledge and spillover effects carried by foreign direct investment vital to close the 
technological gap (Borensztein et al., 1998). To obtain values for this variable we resorted 
to the Foreign Direct Investment: inward flows (percentage of Gross Domestic Product) 
taken from the UNCTAD database. Data is only available for the 1970-2015-time span. 
The measurement of the explanatory variable human capital (HC), as noted by Wößmann 
(2003), is often poorly proxied in empirical growth research. Among its set of 
measurements/proxies, we can include the adult literacy rates, school enrolment ratios, 
and educational attainment of the labour force. The first two measurements present clear 
flaws as the literacy rates neglect the qualifications obtained beyond the basic levels of 
education and the school enrolment ratios corresponds to a flow variable that include 
under-age individuals that are not yet part of a country’s labour force (Wößmann, 2003; 
Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010). Educational attainment is a stock variable that considers the 
total amount of formal education received by the labour force taking into account the 
latter’s degree of qualification (Wößmann, 2003). It thus provides the best available 
information on a country’s level of human capital stock (Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010). 
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Accordingly, the present dissertation uses the average years of schooling of the working-
age population as a proxy for the human capital, in line with other empirical studies (e.g., 
Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Barro, 1997; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Teixeira and 
Fortuna, 2010). Specifically, based on the referenced literature, we use the average years 
of schooling of the population aged 25 years old and over from the human capital database 
constructed by Barro and Lee (2010). This database comprises worldwide data of 
educational attainment for 146 countries in 5-year intervals from 1950 to 2010. 
As mentioned by Griffith, Redding, and Reenen (2003), countries that engage in R&D 
can increase their ability to understand and assimilate foreign discoveries which 
facilitates technology transfers. Therefore, cumulative indigenous R&D efforts play an 
important role in boosting an economy’s productivity and growth (Coe and Helpman, 
1993; Teixeira, 2007). Fagerberg (1987) measures the stock of technological knowledge 
by dividing technological activities into two types: technological inputs (e.g. R&D 
expenditure, scientists and engineer employment), and technological output (e.g. patents). 
In the present dissertation, we favour technological inputs, most notably, domestic 
expenditures on R&D to GDP ratio from the World Bank database. Data is only available 
for the 1996-2015 period. 
As for the control variables (C), government expenditure is represented by the ratio of 
government consumption to GDP (e.g. Landau, 1983; Barro and Lee, 1994, Borensztein 
et al., 1998; Alfaro et al., 2004), more specifically the share of government consumption 
at current PPPs in the Output-side real GDP at current PPPs, whose data come from the 
Penn World Table (version 9.0) database. The inflation rate, extracted from the World 
Bank database, measures the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator. The 
population growth data was also extracted from the World Bank database. To measure 
political stability, we resorted to the political rights (PR) variable from the Freedom 
House database for the 1996-2015 and 2005-2015 periods, estimated in a scale of 1 to 7 
(1=Most Free, 7=Least Free). Finally, in accordance with the importance of trade 
liberalization approached in Section 2.1, we introduced, as a control variable, a trade 
openness indicator that measures the sum of exports and imports of goods and services, 
as a share of gross domestic product, whose data was extracted from the World Bank 
database. 
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3.3. Variables Description  
The dependent variable GDPpcg, measuring annual average growth rate of real GDP per 
capita, represents the heterogeneous economic growth differences among the diversified 
group of chosen emergent countries. The mean value of this variable indicates that the 
economic growth of the analysed countries is 2.9% from 1961 to 2015, with a 5.6 standard 
deviation, as a result of a wide range of economic growth, that variates from a minimum 
negative growth rate of 40.7% (Armenia, 1992) to a maximum positive rate of 33.0% 
(Azerbaijan, 2006) (see Table 3).  
The other independent variable, Total Factor Productivity annual growth rate (TFPg) has 
a considerable lower number of observations (N = 1071), specially compared to the real 
GDP per capita growth rate (N = 1549). As for its mean, TFPg has a mean of 0.7% with 
a 5.1 standard deviation and minimum value of -39.5% (Armenia, 1992) and a maximum 
value of 27.7% (Morocco, 1961) (see Figure 2). 
Table 3: Variables description for the extended model (1961-2015) 
Variables N Mean 
Percen
til 50 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Dependent 
variables 
GDPpcg 
Growth rate of real 
gross domestic 
product per capita (in 
%)  
1549 2.902 3.334 5.598 -40.747 33.030 
TFPg 
Growth rate of Total 
Factor Productivity 
(in %) 
1071 0.726 1.097 5.110 -39.473 27.653 
Core 
variables 
ImpK 
Imports of capital 
goods at current PPPs              
(% of GDP) 
1761 2.936 2.060 2.681 0.005 21.345 
FDI 
Foreign Direct 
Investment: inward 
flows (% of GDP) 
1441 2.278 1.120 3.481 -5.499 38.549 
HC 
Average years of 
schooling of the adult 
population 
1550 5.365 5.170 2.859 0.470 11.740 
R&D 
Domestic 
expenditures on R&D 
(% of GDP) 
383 0.467 0.391 0.328 0.005 2.046 
Control 
variables 
G 
Government 
consumption at 
current PPPs (% of 
GDP) 
1761 20.484 17.416 11.882 1.663 74.471 

Inflation, GDP 
deflator (in %) 
1545 54.233 8.645 300.033 -20.860 6261.2 
Popg 
Population growth (in 
%) 
2115 1.629 1.732 1.204 -3.373 4.189 
Trade 
openness 
Trade (% of GDP) 1486 58.793 51.601 33.425 0.167 178.994 
PR 
Politic rights (1=Most 
Free, 7=Least Free) 
1486 4.454 5.000 2.071 1.000 7.000 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Figure 1:Average growth rate of GDP per capita (1961-
2015)            
Figure 2: Average growth rate of TFP (1961-2015) 
Source: Own computation 
 
Concerning the independent variable trade of capital goods, proxied by share of capital 
goods imports at current PPPs (ImpK), we found a 2.9% average share of imports on 
GDP, with a 2.7 standard deviation, as a result of a set of values that variates from 0.005% 
(Cambodia, 1976) to 21.3% (Mozambique, 2013).  
Another independent variable is the inward flows of foreign direct investment as a 
percentage of the GDP, whose mean is 2.3%, and has a standard deviation of 3.5, resultant 
of a variation between the minimum value of -5.5% (Angola, 2012), and the maximum 
value of 38.5% (Mozambique, 2013). The negative values of this this indicator derive 
from the methodology utilized by the UNCTAD database that calculates FDI flows in net 
bases as a result of capital transactions’ credits less debits made between direct investors 
and their foreign investors which explains the negative results as a result of disinvestment 
or reverse investment. 
As depicted in Figures 3 and 4, there is a clear upward trend in the capital goods imports 
and FDI inflows (in percentage of the GDP) of emergent countries over the last three 
decades, which reflect an increasing importance of the technology transfer channels in 
these economies. 
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Figure 3: Average capital imports share in GDP (1961-
2015) 
Figure 4:Average inward FDI flows in GDP (1970-2015) 
Source: Own computation 
 
Data for human capital reports that individuals aged 25 and plus years of age possess an 
average of 5.4 years of formal schooling, with a 2.9 standard deviation. Thus, the adult 
population of EEs presents relatively low average years of schooling, ranging between a 
minimum of 0.47 years (Morocco, 1961-1965) and 11.7 years (Kazakhstan, 2001-2005).  
Regarding Research and Development (R&D) expenditures as a percentage of GDP, data 
available is scarce (N= 383), covering a limited time span (1996-2013) (see Figure 6). 
R&D intensity presents a low average of 0.47% and a standard deviation of 0.3.  
The absorptive capacity enhancers, human capital and R&D intensity evidence a gradual 
increase over the period in analysis (see Figures 5 and 6). 
   
Figure 5: Average years of schooling (1961-2015) Figure 6:Average R&D intensity (1996-2015) 
Source: Own computation 
 
Regarding the control variables, inflation observes a very high mean, 54.2%. The standard 
deviation of this variable is also very high (300.03), compared to its mean, reflecting the 
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existence of an astonishingly wide range of inflation rates that includes deflation 
(negative inflation rates) (e.g. Turkmenistan, 1990), running inflation, galloping inflation, 
and even hyperinflation (e.g. Peru, 1990). For the trade openness variable, on average and 
considering the whole period in analysis, exports and imports represent about 59% of the 
GDP, which reflects the relatively high importance of international trade for EEs. Finally, 
political rights variable indicator mean indicates that, on average EEs tend to moderately 
protect most of political rights, but this protection can be flawed leading to violation of 
some political rights. The minimum for this variable (1) represents the best performer 
country (e.g. Poland, 2015) whereas the maximum (7) evidence the worst performer (e.g. 
China, 2015). 
Concerning the analyses of our core variables by level of income, we observe (Figure 7) 
that the share of capital goods imports at current PPPs (% of GDP) has a more important 
role in the low and lower middle income countries when compared to the upper middle 
income countries, for the period 1961-1989. However, this situation was reversed in the 
following period, 1990-2015, and the upper middle income countries became the income 
group in which imports of capital goods at current PPPs presented a larger proportion of 
the GDP.  
 
Figure 7: Average capital imports share in GDP (1961-2015) by level of income 
Source: Own computation 
These results coincide with the global results of the share of capital goods imports at 
current PPPs (% of GDP) for all group of incomes that drops between 1961 to 1989 and 
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constantly increases in the 1990-2015 period (1961-1969: 1.82%, 1970-1979: 1.62%, 
1980-1989: 1.61%, 1990-1999: 2.59%, 2000-2009: 4.77%, 2010-2015: 5.06%). 
For the inward flows of foreign direct investment (in % of GDP) variable, data shows that 
the weight of FDI inflows in GDP has been increasing throughout all the analysed periods 
(1970-1979: 0.37%, 1980-1989: 0.50%, 1990-1999: 2.21%, 2000-2009: 3.42%, 2010-
2015: 3.96%). Furthermore, it is also interesting to observe that FDI inflows (% of GDP) 
are larger in low income countries and lower middle income countries than in upper 
middle income countries in the 1990-2015 period - see Figure 8. The dynamics of this 
variable in low income countries (1961-1969: 0.32%; 2010-2015: 5.59%) and lower 
middle income countries (1961-1969: 0.40%; 2010-2015: 3.49%) is also quite 
remarkable.  
 
Figure 8: Average inward FDI flows in GDP (1970-2015) by level of income 
Source: Own computation 
 
Regarding the human capital, data by level of income shows a clear increase of the 
average years of schooling of the adult population in all groups of incomes throughout 
the entire period (1961-2015) – see Figure 9. The low income countries possess the lowest 
educational attainment throughout the entire period (1961-1969: 1.8 years; 2010-2015: 
5.8 years), and on the other side, the upper middle income countries have the highest from 
the beginning (1961-1969: 5.1 years) to the end (2010-2015: 10.3 years).  
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Figure 9: Average years of schooling (1961-2015) by level of income 
Source: Own computation 
 
Data for Research and Development (R&D) expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 
although with limited time availability (1996-2013), indicates that in the upper middle 
income countries R&D presents a larger share of GDP than in the other income group 
countries, despite that difference have been shortened in the 2010-2015 period to the point 
in which R&D expenditures represent a larger share of the GDP in low income countries 
(0.53%) than in the lower middle income countries (0.42%) – see Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10: Average R&D intensity (1996-2015) by level of income 
Source: Own computation 
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Moving on to the analyses by world regions and beginning with the share of capital goods 
imports at current PPPs (% of GDP), we can observe (Figure 11) that East Asia & Pacific 
(1961-1969: 1.63%; 2010-2015: 5.89%), Latin America & Caribbean (1961-1969: 
1.96%; 2010-2015: 4.76%),Sub-Saharan Africa (1961-1969: 2.75%; 2010-2015: 5.20%), 
Europe & Central Asia (1961-1969: 0.36%, 2010-2015: 5.36%) and the Middle East & 
North Africa (1961-1969: 1.90%, 2010-2015: 4.75%) had consistent and remarkable 
increases throughout the entire period, mainly during the 1980-2009 time span, whilst the 
South Asia region had a rather shy growth trajectory (1961-1969: 0.68%, 2010-2015: 
1.83%). 
 
 
Figure 11: Average capital imports share in GDP (1961-2015) by world region 
Source: Own computation 
 
Concerning the inward foreign direct investment flows (% of GDP), there is in total terms 
(all regions included), during the entire period (1970-2015), a clear growth of the weight 
of foreign direct investment flows as a share of GDP (1970-1979: 0.37%; 1980-1989: 
0.50%; 1990-1999: 2.21%; 2000-2009: 3.42%; 2010-2015: 3.96%) – see Figure 12. 
Moreover, inward foreign direct investment flows as a share of GDP has an outstanding 
increase on the Sub-Saharan Africa region (1970-1979: 0.36%; 1980-1989: 0.57%; 1990-
1999: 2.44%; 2000-2009: 3.90%; 2010-2015: 6.70%). 
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Figure 12: Average inward FDI flows in GDP (1970-2015) by world region 
Source: Own computation. 
 
Data for the human capital variable highlights that the average years of schooling of the 
adult population has grown in all world regions throughout all the periods (1961-2015: 
3.19 years; 1970-1979: 4.07 years; 1980-1989: 5.23 years; 1990-1999: 6.39 years; 2000-
2009: 7.49 years; 2010-2015: 7.83 years) – see Figure 13. The most highly educated 
region is Europe & Central Asia (1961-1969: 4.92 years; 2010-2015: 10.49 years) and 
the least educated is the Middle East & North Africa (1961-1969: 0.51 years; 2010-2015: 
4.24 years). 
 
Figure 13: Average years of schooling (1961-2015) by world region 
Source: Own computation 
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Domestic R&D expenditure (in % of GDP) registers a shy global tendency to grow across 
the 1996-2015 period (1996-1999: 0.38%; 2010-2015: 0.50%). Analysing by world 
regions, it is relevant to observe that in the 2000-2015 period, R&D domestic 
expenditures represent a larger share of the GDP in the Middle East & North Africa region 
(2000-2009: 0.62%; 2010-2015: 0.71%) than in any other region of the world – see Figure 
14. Moreover, domestic expenditures on R&D (% of GDP) has increased remarkably on 
the Sub-Saharan Africa region (1996-1999: 0.01%; 2000-2009: 0.24%; 2010-2015: 
0.43%), leavening the place of lowest spender on R&D (% of GDP) to the Latin America 
& Caribbean region by the end of the period (2010-2015: 0.30%). 
 
 
Figure 14: Average R&D intensity (1996-2015) by world region 
Source: Own computation 
 
3.4. Diagnosis tests  
3.4.1. Multicollinearity 
An important aspect of the growth model is the use of correlated variables, which might 
hamper the model from identifying the individual impact of the correlated variables 
leading to unreliable regression estimations due to the existence of a near perfect linear 
relationship between the estimated analysed variables (Verbeek, 2004). 
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As observed in the correlation matrix (see Table A1 in Appendix) we can conclude that 
there is a relatively high correlation among some variables, most notably between trade 
openness and imports of capital goods, population growth and human capital (average 
years of schooling of the adult population) and between Government expenditures and 
population growth. 
The VIF test for collinearity provides an index measurement of how the variance of an 
estimated coefficient is inflated by the presence of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2004; 
O’Brien, 2007). However, literature does not propose a clear cut threshold indicative of 
when multicollinearity levels have become too excessive and unacceptable (O’Brien, 
2007). Some accepted thresholds include a value for the VIF as low as 4 to values as high 
as 10 or higher (O’Brien, 2007). The most commonly accepted rule of thumb -  the rule 
of 10 – states that values, for this index, exciding 10 reveal the existence of an excessive 
collinearity (Gujarati, 2004; O’Brien, 2007). 
The VIF’s index values estimated for 1961-2015 period (see Table A2 in Appendix) 
indicate the presence of a low collinearity between explanatory models in our model. 
Indeed, the highest VIF is 2.58 (population growth) and the mean VIF is 1.80, which falls 
short from the above referenced values for the rule of thumbs. Most importantly, the VIF 
test was applied to all models (including the TFP models) and the obtained results were 
very similar to the ones we presented above (low collinearity). 
 
3.4.2. Heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity, or unequal variance (Gujarati, 2004), as referenced by Greene (2011: 
297), arises in “volatile high-frequency time-series data” or in “cross-section data where 
the scale of the dependent variable and the explanatory power of the model tend to vary 
across observations”, which might happen when different groups in the sample have 
different variances (Verbeek, 2004).   
Indeed, our empirical estimations employed a panel data of 39 EEs, incorporating a vast 
array of countries with different economic and social realities. According to the World 
Bank income level classification, our panel data contains countries from three different 
income levels in the beginning of our analysis (1961): (i) low income, (ii) lower middle 
income, and (iii) upper middle income. In the final period (2015) some countries (e.g. 
Chile, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Uruguay) reached the high-income level.  
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These 39 countries are also scattered across six different regions (East Asia & Pacific, 
Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North, Africa, North 
America, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa), also according to World Bank classifications. 
After we employed the Breusch–Pagan and White tests for Heteroscedasticity for the 
baseline model (1961-2015), we rejected the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity for the 
most commonly used levels of significance (e.g. 1%, 5% and 10%) (see Table A3 in 
Appendix). Thus, there is evidence of heteroskedasticity (Verbeek, 2004; Greene, 2011) 
which required correction though the estimation of robust standard errors. 
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4. Empirical estimations 
4.1. Global results 
For each proxy of economic growth - the annual average growth rate of real Gross 
Domestic Product per capita (see Table 4, Models A) and Total Factor Productivity 
annual growth rate (see Table 4, Models B) –, we estimate 6 models, 3 without interaction 
terms (Model 1-Model 3), and 3 with interaction terms (Model 4-Model 6), which permits 
to test the absorptive capabilities hypotheses (H6 and H7). Model 1 and Model 4, are the 
baseline models, comprising the whole period in analysis (1961-2015); it thus discards 
R&D intensity and political rights variables as these are only available for more recent 
periods (respectively, 2005-2015 and 1996-2015). Model 2 and Model 5 are estimated 
for the period 1996-2015 – they comprise the baseline model plus the variable political 
rights. Model 3 and Model 6 add to the latter the variable R&D intensity, and covers the 
10 most recent years (2005-2015). 
Given the heteroscedasticity issues, the models were estimated using robust estimation of 
fixed effects panel data model. The option for the fixed effect instead of random effect 
was driven by the theory (being in most of the cases econometrically supported by the 
rejection of the Hausman test).2 
For the 1961-2015 period, without the interaction terms (Model A1), the estimates 
indicate a highly significant effect, at a 1% significance level, of the imports of capital 
goods and FDI inward flows on economic growth. Additionally, the imports of capital 
goods have a slightly larger impact on economic growth than FDI flows: a one percent 
change in the imports of capital goods (FDI inflows) leads to a 0.32 (0.31) percentage 
point increase in economic growth.  
Human capital, proxied by the average schooling of the adult population, fail to emerge 
statistically significant. When we include the interaction terms (Model A4), results 
obtained reinforce the previous evidence: the global marginal impact of imports of capital 
goods (0.3636, p-value<0.01) is higher than that of inward flows of FDI (0.2805, p-
value<0.01). This impact occurs mainly in a direct fashion, with the absorptive capability 
estimates (interaction between human capital and trade channels) being non-significant. 
Such results strongly support H1 (“EEs that import more capital goods from 
                                               
2 The Hausman test is described as a test for model misspecification. In panel data analysis, it helps to 
choose between fixed or random effects model. The null hypothesis is that the two estimation methods are 
adequate and that therefore they should yield similar coefficients. The alternative hypothesis is that the 
fixed effects estimation is adequate and the random effects estimation is not.  
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technological advanced countries tend to present higher growth rates”) and, to some 
extent, H2 (“EEs that receive higher inflows of FDI tend to present higher growth rates”). 
Additionally, the impact of imports of capital goods on economic growth of EEs tend to 
be higher than that of FDI inflows. This permits to corroborate H3 (“The impact of capital 
goods from technological advanced countries on EEs’ economic growth is higher than 
that of FDI”). 
Also without the interaction terms, when we introduce political rights as a control 
variable, which correspond to the period 1996-2015 (Model A2), results indicate a change 
in the importance of the core variables on economic growth: the positive impact of 
imports of capital goods continues to be significant but at a smaller significance level 
(5%) while FDI’s impact becomes non-significant. Thus, we can corroborate H1 and H3 
but there is no sufficient evidence to support or not support H2. 
The introduction of the interaction terms, provides a quite distinct picture, particularly for 
the most recent periods. Indeed, for the whole period, 1961-2015 (Model A4), the global 
impact of the imports of capital goods (in % GDP) and the inward flows of foreign direct 
investment (in % GDP) are statistically significant and positive, with the former having a 
higher impact on EEs economic growth than the latter. Thus, for the period 1961-2015, 
H1, H2 and H3 are validated.  
Regarding the most recent periods (1996-2015 – Model A5 -, and 2005-2015 – Model 
A6), there is not sufficient evidence to corroborated or not corroborate such hypotheses. 
Notwithstanding, in the period 1996-2015, higher FDI inflows directly and indirectly 
(through human capital) positively impact on EEs’ economic growth. In the last ten year 
period (2005-2015), the direct impact of inward flows of foreign direct investment (in % 
GDP), human capital stock, and R&D domestic expenditures in R&D (in % GDP) on 
economic growth is significant but negative, albeit EEs that possess a higher R&D 
intensity managed to significantly benefit from inward flows of foreign direct investment 
(marginal effect estimate of 2.6940 for a p-value<0.05). 
The control variables, when significant, present in general the expected signal. All the 
remaining factors being held constant, on average, EEs with higher public expenditures 
and higher inflation rates tend to growth less, whereas those more open in terms of trade 
and with better institutions (reflected by a lower political rights index, that is, that are 
better ranked in terms of political rights) grow faster. 
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Table 4: Determinants of economic growth, panel data fixed effects (marginal effects, robust standard errors in brackets) 
    
GDP per capita growth TFP growth 
Without interaction With interaction Without interaction With interaction 
1961-2015 1996-2015 2005-2015 1961-2015 1996-2015 2005-2015 1961-2015 1996-2015 2005-2015 1961-2015 1996-2015 2005-2015 
Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 Model A4 Model A5 Model A6 Model B1 Model B2 Model B3 Model B4 Model B5 Model B6 
In
te
r
n
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
tr
a
d
e
's
 
d
ir
ec
t 
im
p
a
c
t Imports of capital goods (in % GDP) 
0.3226*** 
(0.1079) 
0.3256** 
(0.1583) 
1.2894** 
(0.6343) 
0.5920** 
(0.2791) 
0.3010 
(0.4344) 
-2.3396 
(2.0518) 
0.0289 
(0.1352) 
-0.1404 
(0.2826) 
-0.1091 
(0.4458) 
0.0871 
(0.3335) 
0.2082 
(0.4684) 
-2.5477 
(2.0946) 
Inward flows of foreign direct investment (in % GDP) 
0.3137*** 
(0.0999) 
0.1310 
(0.1075) 
0.1787 
(0.1615) 
0.0656 
(0.2371) 
0.4517*** 
(0.1644) 
-1.4386** 
(0.7321) 
0.2162** 
(0.1036) 
0.1724 
(0.1160) 
-0.0627 
(0.1319) 
0.1926 
(0.2490) 
-0.6319** 
(0.2621) 
2.4357*** 
0.7028 
C
o
m
p
et
e
n
c
ie
s Human capital stock 
0.0181 
(0.2135) 
-0.1562 
(0.5941) 
-0.7075 
(1.3946) 
0.0425 
(0.2347) 
-0.3641 
(0.5937) 
-3.5540** 
(1.7320) 
0.1656 
(0.2341) 
0.2442 
(0.5513) 
0.5299 
(1.2329) 
0.1774 
(0.2490) 
0.1981 
(0.5976) 
-3.0724** 
(1.5150) 
R&D domestic expenditures in R&D (in % GDP)   
-9.6536 
(6.3540) 
  
-22.8236** 
(9.8432) 
  
-6.6443 
(5.6985) 
  
20.9012** 
(8.5240) 
A
b
so
r
ti
v
e 
ca
p
a
b
il
it
ie
s Interaction between human capital and the imports of capital 
goods (H6/H1a) 
   
-0.0380 
(0.0305) 
-0.0043 
(0.0418) 
0.2265 
(0.1902) 
   
-0.0074 
(0.0390) 
-0.0415 
0.0512 
0.1009 
(0.1807) 
Interaction between R&D and the imports of capital goods 
(H7/H1b) 
     
1.5004 
(1.3538) 
     
1.4975 
(1.2875) 
Interaction between human capital and foreign direct investment 
(H6/H2a) 
   
0.0358 
(0.0297) 
0.0819*** 
(0.0282) 
0.0470 
(0.0560) 
   
0.0031 
(0.0330) 
0.0911** 
(0.0352) 
0.0847 
(0.0657) 
Interaction between R&D and foreign direct investment (H7/H2b)      
2.6940** 
(1.3350) 
     
3.7200*** 
(1.4170) 
G
lo
b
a
l 
im
p
a
c
t 
Imports of capital goods (in % GDP) (H1)    
0.3636*** 
(0.1376) 
0.2698 
(0.1813) 
0.3440 
(0.7394) 
   
0.0405 
(0.1561) 
-0.1178 
(0.2786) 
-0.8581 
(0.5682) 
Inward flows of foreign direct investment (in % GDP) (H2)    
0.2805*** 
(0.1014) 
0.1463 
(0.0951) 
0.2809 
(0.2204) 
   
0.2119** 
(0.0969) 
0.0842 
(0.1005) 
0.2828 
(0.2710) 
Human capital stock (H4)    
-0.0030 
(0.1985) 
-0.0892 
(0.6007) 
-1.9150 
(1.6674) 
   
0.1585* 
(0.2348) 
0.3190 
(0.5528) 
-2.0589 
(1.3539) 
R&D domestic expenditures in R&D (in % GDP) (H5)      
-1.9703 
(5.9661) 
     
4.4194 
(6.2198) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s 
Government expenditure in GDP 
-0.1435** 
(0.0730) 
-0.1617** 
(0.0768) 
-0.9443* 
(0.4890) 
0.1500*** 
(0.0749) 
-0.1714** 
(0.0694) 
-1.0492** 
(0.4282) 
-0.1596* 
(0.0826) 
0.2139*** 
(0.0774) 
-1.1634** 
(0.5115) 
-0.1608* 
(0.0860) 
0.2144*** 
(0.0714) 
1.2457*** 
(0.3947) 
Inflation 
-0.0020** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0042** 
(0.0019) 
0.1121 
(0.1557) 
-0.0019** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0030* 
(0.0017) 
0.0841 
(0.1383) 
-0.0016** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0012 
(0.0024) 
0.2036** 
(0.0814) 
-0.0016** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0005 
(0.0022) 
0.1021 
(0.0747) 
Population growth 
0.6821** 
(0.3278) 
-0.7849 
(0.6175) 
-2.5585 
(1.7034) 
0.7283** 
(0.3373) 
-1.0765* 
(0.5621) 
-1.3415 
(1.5756) 
1.0455*** 
(0.3266) 
-1.0712* 
(0.6057) 
0.3920 
(1.5301) 
1.0641*** 
(0.3425) 
1.2790** 
0.5782 
1.4206 
(1.6006) 
Trade openness 
-0.0018 
(0.0170) 
0.0108 
(0.0280) 
0.0942* 
(0.0547) 
0.0001 
(0.0177) 
0.0032 
(0.0273) 
0.1435*** 
(0.0508) 
-0.0021 
(0.0167) 
0.0217 
(0.0455) 
0.1453*** 
(0.0525) 
-0.0017 
(0.0187) 
0.0200 
(0.0460) 
0.1673*** 
(0.0440) 
Political rights  
-0.7631** 
(0.3674) 
-1.5175 
(1.7321) 
 
-0.7632** 
(0.3537) 
-1.5261 
(1.7133) 
 
1.3501*** 
(0.5131) 
-2.2708 
(1.7706) 
 
-1.2952** 
(0.4996) 
-1.9167 
(1.8195) 
  Number of observations 911 450 109 911 450 109 677 319 94 677 319 94 
  Number of countries 31 31 25 31 31 25 22 22 20 22 22 20 
  Hausman test (p-value) 
26.68 
(0.0004) 
47.19 
(0.0000) 
91.05 
(0.0000) 
52.74 
(0.0000) 
74.70 
(0.0000) 
NA 
35.59 
(0.0000) 
25.05 
(0.0015) 
24.87 
(0.0031) 
33.20 
(0.0001) 
NA 
15.53 
(0.2753) 
Legend: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Source: Own computations.  
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When we use Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth as proxy for economic growth 
(Models B), results do not greatly match those obtained for the GDP per capita growth. 
Thus, EEs’ productivity dynamics are explained by distinct determinants. 
In our baseline model, without and with interaction (Models B1 and B4), which covers 
the whole period (1961-2015), the only trade channel that has a significant and positive 
marginal effect on both growth models is the inward FDI flows (at a 5% significance 
level). Thus, we can only validate H2 (“EEs that receive higher inflows of FDI tend to 
present higher growth rates”). On our baseline model with interaction (Model B4), 
human capital also has a positive and significant impact on growth (0.1585, p-value<0.1). 
In other words, H4 (“EEs highly endowed with human capital tend to grow faster”) is 
corroborated. For the shortest periods, without interaction (1996-2015 – Model B2 -, and 
2005-2015 – Model B3), all the estimated core variables have a non-significant global 
impact on growth. When we introduce the interaction terms the absorptive capability 
terms present a significant and positive impact on growth, most notably, through the 
interaction of inwards FDI flows with R&D domestic expenditures (3.72, p-value<0.01 – 
Model B6) and human capital (0.0911, p-value<0.05 – Model B5). Thus, the absorptive 
capability hypotheses H6 (H2a) (“The higher the EEs’ human capital stock, the stronger 
the impact of FDI on EEs’ economic growth”) and H7 (H2b) (“The higher the EEs’ R&D 
intensity, the stronger the impact of FDI on EEs’ economic growth”) are validated by our 
data. 
Unexpectedly, the direct effect of inward FDI flows (Model B5), and human capital 
(Model B6) on economic growth is negative and significant. Notwithstanding, the global 
effect of these variables is non-significant and thus H2 (“EEs that receive higher inflows 
of FDI tend to present higher growth rates”) and H4 (“EEs highly endowed with human 
capital tend to grow faster”) cannot be corroborated. 
 
4.2. Results according to income and regions 
EEs are very heterogeneous countries both at the level of income - including countries 
with a low (e.g. Uganda), lower middle (e.g. Albania), and upper middle (e.g. Uruguay) 
income level -, and regions, including countries located in East Asia & Pacific plus South 
Asia, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean’s, and North & Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
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Beginning with the analysis by level of income for the real GDP per capita annual growth 
(see Table 5, Models A7-A9), we observe that for the low-income countries (Model A7), 
all the core variables have an insignificant direct and global marginal effect on growth. 
However, the indirect marginal effect of FDI on growth through human capital holds a 
positive and highly significant impact (0.179, p-value<0.01). This means that, low income 
EEs are only able to reap benefits from FDI if they possess a given positive level of human 
capital stock. In short, the absorptive capability hypothesis H6 (H2a) (“The higher the 
EEs’ human capital stock, the stronger the impact of FDI on EEs’ economic growth”) is 
validated. 
In the case of the lower middle income countries (Model A8), the imports of capital goods 
have a direct positive and significant effect but an indirect (through human capital) 
negative significant marginal effect on growth, which renders a non-significant global 
effect of the imports of capital goods on these countries’ economic growth. Thus, H1 
(“EEs that import more capital goods from technological advanced countries tend to 
present higher growth rates”) cannot be validated. In contrast, FDI inflows impact 
significant and positively (0.295, p-value<0.10) on the economic growth of lower-middle 
income countries. This means that H2 (“EEs that receive higher inflows of FDI tend to 
present higher growth rates”) is validated by our data for lower middle income countries. 
Surprisingly, H5 (“EEs that are highly intensive in R&D tend to grow faster”) is rejected 
as indigenous R&D has a very significant and negative impact (-14.110, p-value<0.01) 
on the economic growth of lower middle income countries.  
In the case of upper middle income countries, the main hypotheses are strongly validated: 
EEs that import more capital goods from technological advanced countries (H1) or that 
receive higher inflows of FDI (H2) tend to present higher growth rates. Moreover, the 
impact of capital goods from technological advanced countries on EEs’ economic growth 
is higher than that of FDI (that is, H3 is true). The absorptive capabilities of upper middle 
income countries, namely in what respects to the absorption of FDI are critical for these 
countries’ economic growth as the higher these countries’ human capital stock (H6/H2a)/ 
R&D intensity (H7/H2b), the stronger the impact of FDI on their economic growth. It is 
interesting to note that although FDI has a positive and significant global impact on upper 
middle income countries’ economic growth, its direct impact is (significantly) negative.  
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Table 5: Determinants of economic growth, panel data fixed effects by countries’ income group and regions (marginal effects, robust standard errors in brackets) 
  Income Region 
    
GDP per capita growth TFP growth GDP per capita growth TFP growth 
Low income 
countries 
Lower middle 
income 
countries 
Upper middle 
income 
countries 
Low income 
countries 
Lower middle 
income 
countries 
Upper middle 
income 
countries 
East Asia & 
Pacific plus 
South Asia 
Europe and 
Central Asia 
Latin America & 
Caraibeens 
SSA +North 
Africa  
East Asia & 
Pacific plus South 
Asia 
Europe and 
Central Asia 
Latin America & 
Caraibeens 
SSA +North 
Africa  
  Model A7 Model A8 Model A9 Model B7 Model B8 Model B9 Model A10 Model A11 Model A12 Model A13 Model B10 Model B11 Model B12 Model B13 
International 
trade's direct 
impact 
Imports of capital goods (in % GDP) 
0.961 1.705* 9.067* 3.654*** 0.244 14.286*** 1.629 5.866** 18.970*** 0.837 1.827 4.444* 9.892*** -0.827*** 
(0.820) (0.998) (5.071) (0.708) (0.944) (3.330) (1.664) (2.760) (2.373) (0.723) (2.437) (2.416) (3.641) (0.029) 
Inward flows of foreign direct 
investment (in % GDP) 
-0.618 0.263 -7.715*** -1.492*** 0.893 -10.34*** -2.198 -3.988* -5.262* -2.327** -5.552** -2.511 -3.723 0.678*** 
(0.498) (0.810) (2.418) (0.460) (0.837) (2.186) (1.823) (2.337) (3.183) (0.269) (2.382) (3.038) (2.708) (0.161) 
Competencies 
Human capital stock 
0.984 0.999 -5.368 2.142** 1.753** 1.248 2.011 -2.129 4.289** 0.306 2.391 0.144 3.014* -1.221** 
(1.075) (0.475) (6.539) (1.042) (0.721) (4.937) (1.540) (1.864) (2.080) (1.706) (2.157) (2.312) (1.737) (0.565) 
R&D domestic expenditures in R&D 
(in % GDP) 
2.982 -14.11*** 3.863 18.988*** -21.591* -11.678 -0.769 -18.109** -7.187 -16.826** 9.028 -20.213** -3.563  
(4.376) (4.457) (19.180) (6.691) (11.098) (11.780) (2.079) (8.586) (23.728) (5.156) (8.023) (8.331) (11.160)  
Absortive 
capabilities 
Interaction between human capital 
and the imports of capital goods 
(H6/H1a) 
-0.072 -0.226** -0.666 -0.035 -0.252** -1.419*** -0.277 -0.496* -2.184*** -0.040 -0.363 -0.479** -1.184*** 0.148*** 
(0.118) (0.099) (0.547) (0.122) (0.103) (0.355) (0.262) (0.278) (0.296) (0.138) (0.366) (0.216) (0.466) (0.052) 
Interaction between R&D and the 
imports of capital goods (H7/H1b) 
-0.045 1.035 -2.562 -3.267*** 3.155 0.124 0.671** -0.467 4.391 0.414 0.184 0.639 -0.399  
(0.545) (0.697) (1.950) (0.861) (2.190) (1.058) (0.323) (0.901) (5.595) (0.522) (1.737) (1.091) (3.394)  
Interaction between human capital 
and foreign direct investment 
(H6/H2a) 
0.179*** -0.011 0.673*** 0.246*** -0.041 0.880*** 0.367 0.265 0.825* 0.346** 0.926** 0.155 0.569 -0.212* 
(0.056) (0.057) (0.158) (0.079) (0.061) (0.159) (0.305) (0.196) (0.479) (0.058) (0.412) (0.255) (0.451) (0.122) 
Interaction between R&D and 
foreign direct investment (H7/H2b) 
-0.874 0.389 3.589** -0.710 -0.364 4.144** -0.685 3.388*** -6.490*** 2.869** 0.594 2.446 -3.100  
(1.334) (0.948) (1.689) (1.259) (0.941) (1.802) (1.836) (1.243) (2.262) (0.357) (2.306) (1.589) (3.459)  
Global impact 
Imports of capital goods (in % GDP) 
(H1) 
0.516 0.062 1.170*** 1.168*** -0.825* 0.223 0.212 0.683*** 2.226*** 0.782*** -0.420 -0.077 0.201 -0.465*** 
(0.378) (0.323) (0.313) (0.334) (0.461) (0.383) (0.462) (0.185) (0.292) (0.254) (0.717) (0.207) (0.667) (0.127) 
Inward flows of foreign direct 
investment (in % GDP) (H2) 
-0.035 0.295* 0.764** -0.491 0.397* 0.475 -0.206 0.194 -0.010 -2.219 0.849 0.210 0.204 0.162 
(0.436) (0.184) (0.397) (0.814) (0.244) (0.438) (0.587) (0.214) (0.581) (2.347) (1.119) (0.201) (0.521) (0.163) 
Human capital stock (H4) 
1.267 -0.233 -7.486 2.610*** 0.266 -5.263 1.477* -3.903*** -1.253 1.669 2.806** -2.065 0.463 -1.057*** 
(0.843) (0.513) (5.449) (1.000) (0.556) (5.150) (0.907) (1.137) (1.257) (1.355) (1.379) (1.425) (1.603) (0.314) 
R&D domestic expenditures in R&D 
(in % GDP) (H5) 
0.301 -7.148 -0.689 7.408 -6.586* 4.120 0.957 -7.112 -14.038 0.205* 11.158** -6.485 -16.679***  
(3.049) (4.527) (13.414) (6.283) (3.753) (8.381) (3.074) (5.764) (8.849) (0.120) (4.739) (5.869) (5.389)  
Control 
variables 
Government expenditure in GDP 
0.021 -0.543*** 0.165 0.113 -0.462* -0.243 -0.125 -0.449** -0.047 0.064 0.189 -0.457*** -0.112 -0.154** 
(0.083) (0.177) (0.498) (0.115) (0.270) (0.390) (0.161) (0.186) (0.262) (0.172) (0.376) (0.176) (0.211) (0.079) 
Inflation 
-0.055* -0.006*** -0.015 0.118* -0.004 -0.052 -0.059 -0.004** 0.183*** -0.087** 0.074 -0.001 0.032 0.007 
(0.030) (0.002) (0.057) (0.061) (0.003) (0.041) (0.080) (0.002) (0.037) (0.041) (0.088) (0.002) (0.027) (0.008) 
Population growth 
1.932 -2.074*** -0.280 6.194 -1.145** 0.571 3.759 -1.175 7.389* 0.562 6.491*** -0.938 12.296** -0.496 
(4.481) (0.644) (2.093) (5.724) (0.564) (2.057) (2.478) (0.998) (4.402) (3.763) (2.002) (0.844) (5.487) (0.333) 
Trade openness 
0.070 0.062 0.248*** 0.064* 0.092 0.245*** 0.077 0.082 0.329** -0.021 0.056 0.105 0.323*** 0.067*** 
(0.074) (0.054) (0.072) (0.037) (0.092) (0.085) (0.054) (0.060) (0.136) (0.072) (0.079) (0.080) (0.032) (0.023) 
Political rights 
1.918*** -0.724 -3.453 3.497*** -1.224* -3.075 0.402 -3.767*** -1.011* 1.352 0.263* -4.607*** -1.229***  
(0.880) (0.614) (3.122) (1.145) (0.641) (2.194) (0.493) (1.373) (0.552) (1.220) (0.154) (1.056) (0.324)  
  Number of observations 68 130 61 45 115 61 61 132 36 30 51 122 36 92 
  Number of countries 12 12 5 6 10 5 9 10 4 6 5 9 4 3 
Legend: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Source: Own computations 
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In a nutshell, upper middle income countries’ economic growth can only be enhanced by 
FDI if these countries possess a given positive level of human capital and R&D intensity, 
that is, adequate absorptive capacities. 
When we use Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth as a proxy for economic growth, 
the results for the low-income countries are drastically more significant. First of all, 
imports of capital goods (in % GDP) have a direct and global positive marginal effect. 
Secondly, inward FDI flows has again a negative and significant (at 1 % significance 
level) marginal direct effect on growth, but a positive and significant (1% level) indirect 
effect through this variable’s interaction with the human capital stock. Finally, regarding 
the internal competencies variables, human capital and R&D domestic expenditures have, 
besides the indirect previously referred, a direct positively significant impact. Thus, all 
the remaining factors being held constant, low income countries tend to growth faster 
when their adult population is highly educated and their R&D intensity is larger. 
Moreover, human capital’s impact is paramount with its marginal effect being also 
globally significant for productivity growth.  
For the lower middle income countries, the R&D domestic expenditures variable exhibits 
a significant direct and global negative effect on growth (at a 10% significance level). 
Moreover, the imports of capital goods also have a significant negative global and 
indirect (through human capital) impact on TFP annual growth. Human capital has a 
significant and positive direct effect on growth (1.753, p-value<0.05), but not in global 
terms. For this group of countries TFP growth is stimulated mainly through the inflow of 
FDI. On average, lower middle income countries that observe a 1 per cent increase in 
their FDI inflows, ceteris paribus, experience a 0.4 percentage points in TFP growth.  
Regarding the upper middle income countries, no main growth driver emerges as globally 
relevant for TFP growth. The growth of productivity only results from the absorptive 
capabilities channel, particularly when involving FDI. Thus, for this group of countries 
H1-H5 are not corroborated but H6 (H2a) and H7 (H2b) are. Additionally, the imports of 
capital goods have a significant direct and positive (14.286, p-value<0.01) marginal effect 
on growth, whereas the FDI directly harms TFP growth of these countries.  
Analysing the estimation results according to world regions, and beginning with the real 
GDP per capita (Model A10-Model A13), we observe distinct patterns among regions in 
what regards knowledge, trade and absorptive capacity determinants. 
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Indeed, for the East Asia & Pacific plus South Asia region (Model A10), the core 
variables fail to directly impact on countries’ economic growth, albeit the indirect impact 
of imports of capital goods through R&D domestic expenditures emerges as significant 
and positive (0.671, p-value<0.05) in accordance with the absorptive capability 
hypothesis, H7(H1b) (“The higher the EEs’ R&D intensity, the stronger the impact of 
capital goods from technological advanced countries on EEs’ economic growth”). The 
only core variable that significantly impacts, at a global level, on the economic growth of 
EEs located in East Asia & Pacific plus South Asia region is human capital (1.48 marginal 
effect, p-value <0.10). So, a high level of formal schooling is the critical determinant of 
the GDP per capita growth of EEs in in East Asia & Pacific plus South Asia region. Thus, 
H4 is validated in the case of the countries located in this region. 
The estimation results for Europe and Central Asia (Model A11), Latin America & 
Caraibeens (Model A12) and Sub-Saharan Africa plus North Africa (Model A13) show 
some similarities. The imports of capital goods present a global positive and highly 
significant (1% level) effect on all the three groups of regions and a significant positive 
direct and negative indirect (trough human capital) marginal effect on the economic 
growth of Europe and Central Asia (Model A11) and Latin America & Caribbean’s 
(Model A12). For all the three regions (Model A11-A13), the inward FDI flows have a 
significant and negative direct effect on economic growth, meaning that a one percent 
change in FDI inflows leads to a given percentage decrease in economic growth.   
Additionally, in Europe and Central Asia (Model A11) and in Sub-Saharan Africa plus 
North Africa (Model A13), a one percent change in R&D domestic expenditures 
generates a 18.1 (Model A11) and a 16.8 (Model A13) percentage point decrease in 
economic growth (at 5% significance level), but a significant and positive marginal effect 
on growth when interacted inward FDI flows. Thus, the impact of FDI inflows on 
economic growth is stronger the higher the internal R&D intensity, resulting in the 
validation of H7 (H2b).  
In the case of countries located in Latin America & Caribbean’s region (Model A12) and 
the Sub-Saharan Africa plus North Africa region (Model A13), on average, countries that 
receive higher inflows of FDI growth as faster as the higher their knowledge endowments 
(i.e., their levels of schooling and R&D intensity, this latter only in the case of SSA plus 
North Africa region).  Interestingly, and unexpectedly, R&D intensity global impact is 
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only statistically significant, and positive, for SSA plus North Africa region which 
corroborates H5. 
Results regarding the global impacts of the core variables are particularly distinct when 
we analyze Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth as proxy for economic growth (see 
Table 5, Model B10- Model B13) compared to those obtained for the GDP per capita 
growth (Models A7-A10). 
For the East Asia & Pacific plus South Asia region (Model B10), inward FDI inflows has 
a direct negative and significant marginal effect on growth (-5.552, p-value<0.05) but a 
positive (0.926) indirect (trough human capital) marginal effect on growth at a 5% 
significance level, hence corroborating H6 (H2a) (“The higher the EEs’ human capital 
stock, the stronger the impact of FDI on EEs’ economic growth”). The internal 
competencies, human capital stock and R&D domestic expenditures, both possess a 
positive marginal effect on growth at a 5% significance level, thus corroborating both H4 
and H5.  
The estimations for the European and Central Asian region (Model B11) present a 4.44 
marginal direct effect (10% level of significance) for imports of capital goods (in % GDP) 
but a negative and significant impact when interacted with human capital, which results 
in the rejection of H6 (H1a) (“The higher the EEs’ human capital stock, the stronger the 
impact of capital goods from technological advanced countries on EEs’ economic 
growth”). Also, R&D expenditures have a negative (-20.213) direct effect on growth, at 
a 5% significance level. Moving for the Latin America & Caribbean (Model B12) results 
estimate that imports of capital goods and human capital have, individually, a positive 
and significant direct marginal effect, but a negative and highly significant (1% level) 
marginal indirect effect when interacted with each other (that is, H6/H1a is rejected). As 
for the global effects, results show that R&D domestic expenditures have a highly 
significant (1%) negative (-16.679) impact on growth, meaning that the H5 does not hold 
for the Latin America & Caribbean region. 
Finally, results for the Sub-Saharan Africa plus North Africa (Model A13) region show 
that imports of capital goods and human capital stock both directly impact growth 
negatively at a 1% and 5 % significance level, respectively. Albeit, if combined, this two 
variables generate a positive (0.148) marginal effect on growth, at a very consistent 1% 
significance level (H6/H1a is validated). . 
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Notwithstanding, when we interact inward FDI flows (direct marginal effect: 0.678, p-
value<0.01) also with human capital the interaction comes out negative (-0.212) and 
significant (10% level). Hence, the absorptive capability hypothesis, H6 (H2a) cannot be 
corroborated for the Sub-Saharan Africa plus North Africa region. For the global impact 
of our core variables the obtained estimations clearly point out that imports of capital 
goods and human capital stock have a negative and highly significant (1% level), resulting 
in the rejection of H1 and H4. 
 
4.3. Discussion 
The obtained results for the baseline (with and without interaction) model (1961-2015), 
for economic growth proxied by real GDP per capita annual growth, indicate that imports 
of capital goods (in % GDP) and inward flows of foreign direct investment (in % GDP) 
have a preponderantly positive impact on economic growth. These results meet the 
literature expectations that imports of capital goods do have a key role in helping less 
technologically developed countries achieving economic and technological development 
through international diffusion of spillover effects and productivity improvements (Lee, 
1994; Krammer, 2010; Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010; Banerjee and Roy, 2014; Cuadros and 
Alguacil, 2014) and foreign direct investment inflows (Li and Liu, 2005; Batten and Vo, 
2009; Wang, 2009; Kramer, 2010; Su and Liu, 2016). Additionally, the impact of imports 
of capital goods has a larger effect on growth than the inward flows of FDI, which is in 
accordance the empirical findings of Krammer (2010) and Glas et al. (2015). 
When we use TFP annual growth as a proxy for economic growth, the conclusions for the 
baseline model reinforce the overall importance of foreign direct investment inflows and 
introduces human capital as a significantly positive variable, as predicted by the existing 
literature (e.g. Schultz, 1961; Becker, 1962; Temple and Voth, 1998; Krammer, 2010; 
Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010; Banerjee and Roy, 2014) that envisions human capital stock 
as a determinant vehicle that facilitates the adoption of international advanced 
technology.  
Moving forward to the shorter and more recent time periods (1996-2015, 2005-2015), the 
estimations present very consistent results for the absorptive capacity by emphasising 
again the importance of foreign direct investment inflows on productivity and output 
growth, most notably when interacted with the human capital stock and R&D domestic 
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expenditures in R&D (in % GDP). This highlights the role of internal capabilities in the 
absorption process of international frontier technology for EEs in line with extant 
literature (Abramovitz, 1986; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Borensztein et al., 1998; Xu, 
2000; Batten and Vo, 2009; Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010; Banerjee and Roy, 2014; 
Elmawazini, 2014). 
Our results uncover an overlooked issue by the studies that have addressed EEs economic 
growth: the heterogeneity /distinct growth patterns among EEs, most notably among low-
high income countries and countries located with distinct world regions.  
The results for the low income countries evidence that the interaction between human 
capital and FDI holds a relevant impact on both productivity and output growth, hence 
meeting literature’s expectations that such countries need to reach a human capital 
threshold in order to benefit from technological transferences from more technological 
sophisticated countries (see Borensztein et al., 1998; Xu, 2000; Batten and Vo, 2009). 
Additionally, productivity in low income countries and contrasting with other income 
groups, is strongly stimulated by two core variables: human capital and imports of capital 
goods. Available literature for the African continent (composed mostly by low income 
countries) highlights the importance of human capital on economic growth (see Akinlo, 
2004; Gyimah-Brempong, Paddison and Mitiku, 2006). Furthermore, Schultz (1989) 
emphasises the importance of schooling and human capital for low income countries to 
achieve economic growth.  
Regarding the middle income countries (lower and upper middle) there is a clearly 
predominant positive impact of inward FDI flows on productivity and output, particularly 
for the lower middle income level. Notwithstanding, the upper middle income countries 
tend to benefit from FDI to a larger extent when they possess a give level of both human 
capital and R&D intensity, that is, possess adequate internal absorptive capabilities. 
Regarding location, we found the existence of asymmetries among regions concerning 
the determinants of economic growth. The results for the core variables evidence that the 
imports of capital goods (in % GDP) have a pivotal role in promoting real output growth 
in all regions, except in the East Asia & Pacific plus South Asia regions. As for the 
competencies variables, results show that R&D intensity stimulates economic growth not 
only in East Asia & Pacific plus South Asia, but, and at the first glance, surprising, in the 
North & Sub-Saharan Africa region. Existing literature available for developing countries 
 40 
and emerging economies (e.g. Kim, 2011; Gyekye, Oseifuah, and Vukor-Quarshie, 2012; 
Gumus and Celikay, 2015; Inekwe,2015) found a positive relation between R&D 
domestic expenditures (both public and private) and economic growth in developing and 
emergent economies. 
Hu and Mathews’s (2005) research has shown that R&D expenditures have been 
accompanied by increases in patenting rates in East Asia, being interpreted by the author 
as a source of a meaningful increase in innovation activities. The source of latecomers’ 
innovative capacity, according to Hu and Mathews (2005), is related not only to the 
extremely relevant private R&D, but also to public R&D expenditures that have played a 
key role in guiding the East Asian on how to utilize their limited resources and finding 
specialization.  
Moreover, human capital has a relevant impact on economic growth on the East Asia & 
Pacific + South Asian regions. Empirical studies for China (East Asia & Pacific) have 
highlighted the role of human capital as an important stimulant of productivity and output 
growth (Wang and Yao, 2003; Fleisher, Li, and Zhao, 2010). Indeed, Fleisher et al. (2010) 
argues that the level of education of the population has a direct (through worker’s skills 
and domestic innovation activities) and indirect (trough technological spillover effects on 
Total Factor Productivity growth) considerable impact on economic growth. Foster and 
Rosenzweig’s (1996) findings for India (South Asia) reinforce the idea that a more 
educated population is more likely to better absorb new technologies, facilitate productive 
innovation and take advantage of technical progress. Most importantly, empirical results 
for South Asia (India and Pakistan) have also found a positive relation between the human 
capital proxy and economic growth (Abbas, 2000).  
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5. Conclusion  
The present dissertation based on three panel data sets for 39 Emergent Economies (as 
classified by Saccone (2017)) over a long (54 years: 1961-2015), intermediate (19 years: 
1996-2015) and a short (10 years: 2005-2015) period of time, aimed to test the 
“absorptive” capacity hypotheses by analysing the impact of Trade, FDI, Human capital, 
R&D and their interactions on economic growth (measured by productivity and output 
per capita growth). Furthermore, it also accounted for panel data’s heterogeneity by 
analysing the absorptive capacity of the 39 EEs according to their income and 
geographical groups.  
 
Main contributions 
The main contributions of the present dissertation are three fold. 
First, it helps to disentangle the relative importance of knowledge endowments (human 
capital and R&D) and trade (FDI, and imports of capital goods) in EEs’ long run growth.  
As others before us have shown, albeit focusing on less developed countries’ growth (see 
Coe et al., 1997; Fagerberg, 1994; Krammer, 2010), the imports of machinery and 
equipment emerged as an important carrier of technological development and 
productivity growth to EEs, particularly in terms of real GDP per capita growth for the 
whole period in analysis (1960-2015). This confirms extant evidence (see Lemoine and 
Ünal-Kesenci, 2004) that, in line with other countries (Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010; 
Banerjee and Roy, 2014), EEs use the trade of intermediate goods as a channel to acquire 
new frontier technology, being later introduced in their production processes as 
technological advanced inputs, which then results in the development of new products 
and new skills and competences.  
Although for the whole period (1960-2015) the impact of capital goods imports from 
technological advanced countries on EEs’ economic growth is higher than that of FDI, 
confirming some extant evidence for some developing countries across Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America (Neelankavil et al., 2012), for the most recent periods (1996-2015 and 
2005-2015), EEs’ most important growth pushers (both for GDP per capita and TFP) are 
the absorptive capacities, most notably the interaction between human capital/R&D and 
foreign direct investment. Thus, as several studies highlighted for other countries (e.g., 
Teixeira and Fortuna, 2010; Banerjee and Roy, 2014; Su and Liu, 2016), in the more 
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recent periods there is strong evidence of the importance of human capital and domestic 
investments in R&D for EEs in their absorption process of spillovers that come from FDI. 
In this vein, for the EEs multinational corporations seem to be crucial to spread 
technology world-wide, being an important vehicle of technology improvement to EEs 
by promoting the transmission of advanced technologies and managerial skill 
(Borensztein et al., 1998; Forte and Moura, 2013).  
Summing up, we demonstrate that in the case of EEs as a whole, from 1996 onwards, a 
certain threshold of human capital and/or internal R&D is necessary to absorb 
international frontier technological spillovers, namely those that emerge from FDI 
inflows. 
 
Second, it discloses how human capital and R&D interact with trade (i.e., country’s 
absorptive capacity) and impacts on long run economic growth of EEs. 
Our results show that for EEs to absorb the technology embodied in imports or FDI it is 
necessary to build technological domestic knowledge and capacities driven by human 
capital and indigenous R&D investments to learn, assimilate and replicate the technology 
embodied in these trade channels. This corroborates other studies (Dulleck and Foster, 
2008; Fu et al., 2011), which underline that technology diffusion through trade cannot be 
successful on its own, but it is rather the result of a complementary relation between the 
internal efforts to develop absorption capacities plus the international spillovers that come 
from foreign frontier technology. 
Our results for the most recent periods (1996-2015 and 2005-2015) support the contend 
that the creation of a domestic threshold of human capital is a vital condition for EEs’ 
absorptive capacity of FDI spillovers by contributing to reduce the ‘knowledge gap’ 
between the recipient country and the developed world. It is likely that the presence of 
multinationals contributes to enhance human capital formation by providing training to 
the local labor force (Teixeira and Shu, 2012; Teixeira and Lehmann, 2014), permitting 
the strategic restructuring and upgrading of equipment and production processes, and the 
introduction of new products and processes (Konings, 2000; Un, 2016), and ultimately to 
enhance economic and total factor productivity growth. 
Third, it uncovers profound heterogeneity of EEs’ growth paths by providing an in depth 
analysis of long run growth determinants by group of income (low, medium, medium-
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high income) and world regions (East Asia & Pacific plus South Asia, Europe and Central 
Asia, Latin America & Caraibeens, and North & Sub-Saharan Africa). Although there are 
some studies that have analyzed EEs in this regard, they only analyzed the BRIC (Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China) as a whole (Glas et al., 2016) or focused on one of EEs 
individually (e.g., India - Banerjee and Roy, 2014; China - Su and Liu, 2016). They thus 
disregarded EEs’ heterogeneity.  
 
Policy implications 
The obtained results for our estimations imply that in order for Emergent Economies to 
close the technological gap and promote economic and productivity growth, these 
countries should open their borders to trade (e.g., imports of capital goods such as 
machinery, equipment and transportation) and FDI (e.g., inward foreign direct investment 
flows) as a vehicle to acquire technology only available in more devolved countries. 
Moreover, countries’ policies should promote the creation of a threshold of internal 
absorptive capacities capable of taking advantage of the acquired frontier foreign 
technologies. Those policies should focus on building internal competencies which 
implies the necessity of investing on improving human capital (mainly through education) 
whose input on economic growth tend to be scarce in less developed countries due to 
insufficient schooling (Schultz,1989). In developing countries (e.g. low income 
countries) investment in primary schooling is priority to raise the quality of human capital 
and promote economic growth (Schultz, 1989; Psacharopoulos, 1994). 
Additionally, investing in technology/knowledge intensive-activities (e.g. indigenous 
Research and Development activities – both public and private) not only helps EEs to 
better understand advanced technology and learn from foreign technological 
sophisticated capital goods, but also helps them develop their own innovation activities.  
 
Limitations and paths for future research 
A countries’ internal human capital stock is a very difficult variable to measure, being 
often poorly proxied in empirical growth research (Wößmann, 2003). Among the 
different flawed sets of measurements, educational attainment accounts for the total 
amount of formal education possessed by the labour force and provides the best available 
information on a country’s internal level of human capital stock (Teixeira and Fortuna, 
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2010). Thus, the present dissertation used the average years of schooling of the working-
age population as a proxy for the human capital. However, this proxy is far from being 
considered a perfect measurement of a countries’ level of human capital stock. The 
average years of schooling as a proxy for human capital by quantifying the analyses on 
human capital, gives the same weight to any year of schooling, despite the schooling 
system in which it has taken place, hence neglecting the quality and efficiency of the 
educational system (Wößmann, 2003). This analysis considers that increases in 
productive human capital by year of schooling is the same, despite the cross-national 
education system differences in which the individuals are enrolled. Indeed, the quality of 
education differs across countries which means that the cognitive skills and knowledge 
acquired by the labour force in one year of schooling is different depending on the 
educational system in question (Wößmann, 2003; Hanushek and Wößmann, 2007). 
Pritchett’s (2001) results emphasises that the contributions of education on growth have 
been very disappointing and very different across world regions which might be explained 
by the lack of educational quality in many countries that were (and still are) unable to 
transmit productive cognitive skills and knowledge to the labour force that can positively 
impact productivity and economic growth. 
Moreover, other problems arise from this proxy, as it considers that the productivity 
differentials between workers is proportional to their years of schooling which might 
neglect the decreasing returns by the level of schooling (Psacharopoulos, 1994; 
Wößmann, 2003).  
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Appendix 
Table A 1: Correlation matrix between all the variables used in our models (1961-2015, 1996-2015, 2005-2005) 
 
GDPpcg TFPg ImpK FDI HC R&D Government 
expenditures 
Inflation Population 
growth 
Trade 
openness 
Political 
rights 
GDPpcg 1           
TFPg 0.7912 1          
ImpK 0.1056 0.0537 1         
FDI 0.1565 -0.0084 0.3136 1        
HC 0.0940 0.2174 0.2537 0.2550 1       
R&D 0.1832 0.0030 0.1036 -0.0630 -0.1170 1      
Government 
expenditures 
0.0195 0.0244 0.3292 0.2114 0.5489 0.1736 1     
Inflation -0.1059 -0.0882 -0.1173 0.0149 0.0099 -0.0153 0.0313 1    
Population 
growth 
-0.1158 -0.2081 -0.3619 -0.1348 -0.7532 -0.0860 -0.7340 -0.0403 1   
Trade openness 0.1327 0.1761 0.7067 0.3521 0.4174 -0.0813 0.4935 0.0223 -0.5343 1  
Political rights 0.1731 0.0473 -0.2909 -0.0429 -0.1641 0.0804 -0.3185 -0.0287 0.2827 -0.1622 1 
Note: Grey cells indicate values greater than 0.7 and smaller than -0,7. 
Source: Own computation 
 
 55 
Table A 2: The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test for the baseline model (GDPpcg: 1961-2015) 
Variables VIF 
Population growth 2.58 
HC 2.53 
Trade openness 1.88 
ImpK 1.76 
Government expenditure 1.47 
FDI 1.36 
Inflation 1.05 
Mean VIF 1.80 
 
Source: Own computation 
 
Table A 3: Heteroskedasticity tests applied to the baseline model (GDPpcg: 1961-2015) 
 
Test Chi2 p-value 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 57.00 0.000 
White  245.95 0.000 
 
Source: Own computation 
 
 
 
